History
Higher level and standard level
Paper 1 – source booklet

Specimen paper

1 hour

Instructions to candidates

- Do not open this source booklet until instructed to do so.
- This source booklet contains the sources required for history higher level and standard level paper 1.
- Choose one section.
- Read all the sources in your chosen section and answer the accompanying questions in the question paper.
- The sources in this paper may have been edited and/or abridged: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets [ ]; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses … ; minor changes are not indicated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section 1: Military leaders</th>
<th>Sources A – D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section 2: Conquest and its impact</td>
<td>Sources E – H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3: The move to global war</td>
<td>Sources I – L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 4: Rights and protest</td>
<td>Sources M – P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 5: Conflict and intervention</td>
<td>Sources Q – T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section 1: Military leaders

Read sources A to D below and answer questions 1 to 4 in the accompanying question paper. The sources and questions relate to case study 1: Genghis Khan (c1200–1227) – Leadership: motives and objectives; success in achieving those objectives and importance of Genghis Khan's leadership to Mongol success.

Source A


Even at a young age, Genghis Khan saw that the nomadic Mongol tribes were a weak society due to their endless internal warfare …

Genghis Khan’s strength was in understanding the power of unity. By the age of 20, he used this wisdom to build an army that set out to destroy the divisions between tribes in what was soon to be his massive Mongol Empire. As he conquered, instead of exiling the region’s soldiers and killing the survivors, as commonly happened, he absorbed each conquered territory under his personal rule. This strategy helped him to expand the Mongol Empire quickly and efficiently, making use of all the talents, skills and abilities of the people in his newly acquired territories.

Genghis Khan had two primary directives: dominance and unity. He promoted army officers based on achievements rather than family ties. His was a system in which success and loyalty were rewarded. Due to his policies, tribal or ethnic divisions did not form in his ranks, ending the feudal alliances that had been so strong in medieval Mongolia.

Source B


The question that had to be faced was: what now? The tribes of Mongolia had a supreme ruler. Chinese policy had failed – it had failed to keep the tribes in conflict with each other. But unless something decisive was done with the newly formed military machine, it would go back to its earlier state. This, to my mind, is at least one explanation for the beginnings of the Mongols’ astonishing career of conquest. A superb army, potentially invincible in the field in thirteenth-century conditions, had been successfully created. But if it was not used against external enemies, it would not remain in existence for long. The only matter that required a decision was in which direction the armies were to advance.
The belief that it was destiny for the Mongols to rule was not the only, or even main, reason for the ongoing Mongol expansion under Genghis Khan and his successors. Other factors which helped Genghis Khan’s rise to power were the particular political relations within the region at this time … as well as plain luck. On a more fundamental level, territorial expansion into neighboring areas was essential for nomadic states in the region, motivated as they were by the desire to control the manufactured and agricultural goods which could be found there.

Expansion was also a crucial part of the role of the nomadic ruler, and a ruler who did not succeed in this was soon abandoned by his followers. The flexible nature of Turko–Mongolian tribal society made possible both the rapid construction of larger tribes and the absorption of foreign nomadic groups, giving the tribal leader the power to launch his campaigns of expansion. The warrior culture and ethos of tribesmen must also have contributed to Turko–Mongol ambition. Finally, the archery and riding skills of the tribesmen, along with their endurance, made them excellent soldiers in the conquering armies.

End of Section 1
Section 2: Conquest and its impact

Read sources E to H below and answer questions 5 to 8 in the accompanying question paper. The sources and questions relate to case study 2: the conquest of Mexico and Peru (1519–1551) – key events and actors: Hernán Cortés and the campaign against the Aztec Empire; alliances with indigenous populations.

Source E

On November 8, 1519, the Spanish conquistadors first entered the great city of Mexico, the metropolis the Aztecs had built on a lake island. Cortés and his men entered the city, not only as guests, but also as gods coming home.

When the Spaniards were installed in the palace, they asked Moctezuma about the city’s resources and reserves and about the warriors’ ensigns and shields. They questioned him closely and demanded gold. Moctezuma guided them to it. They surrounded him and crowded close with their weapons. When they arrived at the treasure house, the riches of gold and feathers were brought out to them: ornaments made of quetzal feathers, richly worked shields, discs of gold, the necklace of idols, bracelets and crowns. The Spaniards immediately stripped the feathers from the gold shields and ensigns. They gathered all the gold in a great pile and set fire to everything else, regardless of its value. Then they melted down the gold. They searched through the whole treasure house, questioning and quarreling, and seizing every object they thought was beautiful.

The Aztecs were too frightened to approach. They would not risk coming forward. Yet they did not abandon the Spaniards to hunger and thirst. They brought them whatever they needed. They delivered the supplies to the Spaniards with trembling hands, then turned and hurried away.

Source F
Hernán Cortés, a Spanish conquistador, writing in a letter to Emperor Charles V (1520). Charles V was also known as Charles I, King of Spain.

The following morning, the Aztecs came out of the city to greet me with many trumpets and drums, including many persons whom they regard as priests in their temples, dressed in traditional clothes and singing, as they do in the temples. They led us into the city and gave us very good quarters, where all those in my company were most comfortable …

During the three days I remained in that city they fed us worse each day, and the lords and principal persons of the city came only rarely to see and speak with me … Because of this and because of other signs I had observed, I decided to attack, and I sent for some of the chiefs of the city, saying that I wished to speak with them. I put them in a room and meanwhile warned our men to be prepared to fall on the many Indians who were outside our quarters and on those who were inside.

We fought so hard that in two hours more than three thousand men were killed. We took them by surprise, they were easy to disperse, especially because I had imprisoned their leaders.
Source G  Emanuel Leutze, a German painter, depicts an attack by Cortés and his troops in the painting *Storming of the Teocalli by Cortez and his troops* (1848).


Moctezuma and his nobles visited their guests’ quarters often to provide for all their needs. Cortés understood with the greatest clarity that they were trapped if Moctezuma chose to make it so. The Spaniards were surrounded by a multitude of Indians who could rise on signal. The Spanish soldiers expressed their anxiety to Cortés, who now resolved on a bold and desperate course – he would seize as hostage Moctezuma himself. This turn of events was inconceivable to the dignified lord of the Aztecs, but he finally submitted.

To limit the rising anger among his people, Moctezuma announced that he was not a prisoner; he resided with the strangers voluntarily, because it was the will of the gods. Furthermore, if Montezuma feared the revolt of nearby city-states then Cortés could provide the best means of coercing their alliance. The Spanish captain agreed to depart whenever Moctezuma wished. The relieved ruler promised more gold and added that there was no great hurry in leaving. Cortés, of course, had no intention of departing.

End of Section 2
Section 3: The move to global war

Read sources I to L below and answer questions 9 to 12 in the accompanying question paper. The sources and questions relate to case study 1: Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931–1941) – Events: the Three Power/Tripartite Pact.

Source I

The first three articles of the Three Power/Tripartite Pact agreed between Germany, Italy and Japan in Berlin on 27 September 1940.

The governments of Germany, Italy and Japan have agreed as follows:

**Article one**: Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in establishment of a new order in Europe.

**Article two**: Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in greater East Asia.

**Article three**: Germany, Italy and Japan agree to cooperate in their efforts. They further agree to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting powers is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese–Japanese conflict.

Source J


By September 1940, Britain could be assured of continued American support, and the United States had already implemented some of its embargoes against Japan. Under the circumstances, there would have been no way in which an Axis pact would cause the Anglo-American powers to soften their stand. On the contrary, the pact could be expected to give them added resolve to stand firm. This is exactly what happened.

Japanese and German negotiators were fully aware of the developing ties between America and Britain, and for this very reason they hoped their alliance would serve to check and reduce the effectiveness of American intervention. By then, as Matsuoka [the Japanese Foreign Minister] explained at the time, it was becoming obvious that the United States was steadily involving itself not only in European but in Asian-Pacific affairs as well. It was tying itself not just to the British in the Atlantic but to the Commonwealth in Asia and the Pacific. The United States, in fact, would establish itself as a global power, with its influence in the Atlantic, Canada, the Western hemisphere, the Pacific Ocean and Asia. It followed, then, that it would be an American-led coalition that Japan had to confront and be prepared to fight. It would no longer be China in isolation, but China assisted by the Soviet Union, Britain, and especially the United States.
Source K  

The American response quickly revealed the folly of Matsuoka’s claim – that the Tripartite [Three Power] Pact would serve as a deterrent. Instead, it merely confirmed American views that Japan was a belligerent [warlike], bullying, imperialist force in the Far East, an Asian equivalent of Nazi Germany, and had to be stopped. Such views seemed confirmed by the entry of Japanese troops into French Indochina on 23 September 1940. The essential purpose of the Tripartite Pact, from the Japanese perspective, was to deter the United States from intervening to prevent the southern advance seen as necessary to ensure Japan’s control of raw materials and, therefore, her future economic and political security.

The gamble in the pact was self-evident. What if the United States did not regard the pact as a deterrent, but as a provocation? What if the effect was to reinforce the determination to prevent Japanese expansion by threatening the lifeline of oil supplies? But from a Japanese perspective at the time, the gamble had to be taken. To take it held great dangers, but also the potential of enormous rewards. Not to take it meant long-term domination by the Anglo-American powers. It meant, too, that the China War had been in vain. The need for boldness, not caution, carried the day in such a mentality.

Source L  
Harold “Mick” Armstrong, a cartoonist, depicts Japan announcing a “new order” in greater East Asia in a cartoon published in the Australian newspaper *The Argus* (1940).

End of Section 3
Section 4: Rights and protest


Source M


When the civil rights workers invaded the state [Mississippi] in the summer of 1964 to change us, presumably into their own image, they were met with a feeling of some curiosity, but mostly resentment. They fanned out [spread] across the state, made a great to-do [show] of breaking up our customs, of challenging social practices that had been respected by people here over the years. That was the time of the hippies just coming in. Many had on hippie uniforms and conducted themselves in hippie ways. They were not exactly the types of models that most people that I knew wanted to emulate [copy]. Also the arrogance that they showed in wanting to reform a whole state in the way they thought it should be created resentment.

Source N

Charles Patterson, an author and historian, writing in a student study guide The Civil Rights Movement (1995).

Freedom Summer was designed to register blacks for a real election – the 1964 presidential election. The ambitious goals of the project were to register as many blacks as possible across the state; organize a “Freedom Democratic Party” to challenge the official whites-only Mississippi Democratic Party; set up “freedom schools” for black children and establish community centers for blacks who needed medical or legal help. Student volunteers were recruited at elite colleges in the Northeast, large universities in the Midwest and black colleges in the South … The day after the first wave of about 200 students arrived in Mississippi – three young civil rights workers disappeared … The disappearance of the civil rights workers failed to deter the work of the Freedom Summer volunteers, nor did the arrests, shootings and burnings of churches that served as “freedom schools”…

The most dramatic result of the Freedom Summer was the creation of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP). Organized by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) to challenge the legitimacy and supremacy of Mississippi’s all-white regular Democratic Party. Freedom Summer volunteers convinced 80,000 blacks to join the MFDP … Although the MFDP was never officially recognized by the state Democratic Party, its dramatic challenge marked the beginning of the end of exclusive white political control of the state … Freedom Summer was also important for the civil rights movement itself because it moved the struggle to a new level, beyond the bus boycotts, freedom rides and sit-ins. Mississippi blacks demonstrated to the nation that they wanted to vote, elect representatives, and have a voice in government. They wanted the political power they were entitled to as American citizens, black people were fighting for more than a seat at the lunch counter, they were now fighting for seats in the legislature.
Source O  
Frank Miller, a cartoonist, depicts a Mississippi sheriff [law enforcement officer] arresting a civil rights activist in a cartoon published in the US newspaper *The Des Moines Register* (July 1964). The caption on the t-shirt reads “civil rights volunteer”.

![Cartoon of a Mississippi sheriff arresting a civil rights activist.](image)

Sheriff: “Caught him trespassing on private property!”

Source P  

More than 700 college students, in the summer of 1964, under the supervision of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, risked their lives to travel to Mississippi to register black voters and open schools … Many Americans remember the names Andrew Goodman, James Cheney and Michael Schwerner, the three young volunteers who vanished that summer, their bodies later found buried under a dam. What many forget is that these three men disappeared on the very first day of the Mississippi Summer Project (Freedom Summer). Their abduction terrified the other volunteers.

Much more was to come. Some 35 black churches were burned in Mississippi that summer, and five dozen homes and safe houses were bombed. Volunteers were beaten, harassed by the police, arrested on fraudulent charges. Shotguns were fired into the houses where they slept. Pickup trucks filled with armed men followed volunteers around … The summer of 1964 in Mississippi was in some ways a failure for the volunteers. They didn’t register as many voters as they had hoped. Their plans to replace Mississippi’s all-white delegation at the 1964 Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City came to nothing. But their actions brought the nation’s full attention to Mississippi’s second-class citizens.

End of Section 4
Section 5: Conflict and intervention

Read sources Q to T below and answer questions 17 to 20 in the accompanying question paper. The sources and questions relate to case study 1: Rwanda (1990–1998) – Course and interventions: Response of the international community; the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR); reasons for inaction.

Source Q


1. Force Commander was put in contact with informant [Jean-Pierre Abubakar Turatsinze] by an important government politician. Informant is a top-level trainer of the Interhamwe-armed militia …

6. Principal aim of Interhamwe was to protect Kigali from the RPF [Rwandan Patriotic Front]. Since UNAMIR arrived he has been ordered to register all Tutsi in Kigali. He suspects it is for their extermination. Example he gave was that in 20 minutes his personnel could kill 1000 Tutsis.

7. Informant states he disagrees with anti-Tutsi extermination. He supports opposition to RPF but cannot support killing of innocent persons.

8. Informant is prepared to provide location of many weapons … He was ready to go to the storage location tonight, if we guarantee that he and his family be placed under our protection.

9. It is our intention to take action within the next 36 hours …

11. Force commander does have certain reservations on why the informant is now suddenly deciding to release such information. Possibility of a trap not excluded …

13. Where there’s a will, there’s a way. Let’s go.

Source R

Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire, the former Force Commander for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), writing in his memoirs of the conflict in Rwanda, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (2003).

The message from Kofi Annan caught me by surprise. Annan spelled out in excruciating detail the limits New York was placing upon me: as force commander of a chapter-six peacekeeping operation I was not allowed to conduct deterrent operations in support of UNAMIR. Also, in the interests of transparency, I was to pass on to President Habyarimana the information that Jean-Pierre Abubakar Turatsinze had given to us … For the rest of the week, I made phone call after phone call to New York, arguing over the necessity of raiding the arms stores. During these exchanges, I got the feeling that New York saw me as unpredictable and uncontrollable. The deaths and injuries suffered by the American Rangers in Somalia must have had a huge impact on the DPKO [Department of Peacekeeping Operations] and many member nations …

Just before going to see Habyarimana on January 12, I briefed the ambassadors of Belgium and the United States, and the chargé d’affaires of France. All of them acknowledged the information we provided and stated they would inform their respective governments. None of them appeared to be surprised, which led me to conclude that our informant was merely confirming what they already knew.
Over time, the “genocide fax” became a symbol of the failure of the international community to prevent mass-killing in Rwanda. Thanks to new documents, it is now possible to piece together a fuller account of the man who inspired the fax, and how and why UN officials responded, or failed to respond, to his warnings.

Half-Hutu and half-Tutsi, Jean-Pierre Abubakar Turatsinze [the informant] operated on both sides of the political and ethnic divisions in pre-genocidal Rwanda … By 1990, he worked as an intermediary to the Interahamwe. He had been given the assignment of distributing weapons to Interahamwe members, but was suspected of selling many of these for personal profit …

Turatsinze met with UNAMIR [United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda] officers through January and February 1994, but he declined to show them the lists of Tutsis identified for “extermination” that he claimed to have compiled on MRND [National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development, the ruling party in Rwanda] instructions … Turatsinze misled UN peacekeepers on key points and exaggerated his own importance. One of the structural weaknesses of UNAMIR was the lack of a professional intelligence evaluation unit, to fully evaluate Turatsinze’s credibility.

Acknowledgments

Section 1

Section 2
Online: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8d/Leutze%2C_Emanuel_%E2%80%94_Storming_of_the_Teocalli_by_Cortez_and_His_Troops_%E2%80%94_1848.jpg [accessed 24 March 2016]

Section 3

Section 4

Section 5
Online: https://nsarchive.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/19940111-request-for-protection-for-informant.pdf [accessed 24 March 2016]
Online: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBBB452/ [accessed 24 March 2016]
Online: http://client.globecartoon.com/cgi-bir/WebObjects/GCAdmin.waw/realImage?UID=1002879 [accessed 24 March 2016]